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PATENTING LIFE: BIOTECHNOLOGY, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ETHICS 
Ned Hettinger* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Human beings must determine an appropriate relationship to the 
earth and live accordingly. This task is more important now than ever 
before. Nonhuman forms of life and nonhumanized habitats are dis-
appearing fast. The rate of anthropogenic species extinction is hun-
dreds-perhaps thousands-of times greater than normal back-
ground extinction rates, resulting in a possible loss of one-quarter of 
all species on earth within fifty years.! One eminent scientist suggests 
that "we are in the midst of one of the great extinction spasms of 
geological history."2 Our species, Homo sapiens, one species among 
millions of others,3 now appropriates between twenty and forty per-
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, College of Charleston, Charleston, S.C., e-mail, Hettin-
gerN@CofC.edu; B.A. 1974 Denison University; Ph.D. 1985 University of Colorado at Boulder 
The author thanks Karen Burnett, Gary Comstock, Pete Hinckley, Dale Jamieson, and David 
Kline for stimulating comments and criticisms. The author benefited greatly from discussions 
of draft versions of this Article with philosophers at the Center for Values and Social Policy at 
the University of Colorado at Boulder and with the participants at a Symposium on Ethics and 
Patenting of Transgenic Organisms sponsored by the National Agricultural Biotechnology 
Council and the Center for Biotechnology Policy and Ethics at Texas A&M University. 
1 See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 280 (1992); Paul R. Ehrlich & Edward 
O. Wilson, Biodiversity Studies: Science and Policy, 253 SCIENCE, 758, 760 (1991). 
2 WILSON, supra note 1, at 280. There have been approximately a dozen mass extinctions 
chronicled in the fossil record. See NEIL CAMPBELL, BIOLOGY, 500 (2d ed. 1990). It typically has 
taken between 2 and 10 million years for the earth to rebuild its former diversity after major 
catastrophic extinctions. Homo sapiens are only about 250 thousand years old. For discussion, 
see Steven Jay Gould, The Golden Rule-A Proper Scale for our Environmental Crisis, NAT. 
HIST., Sept. 1990, at 24--30. 
3 1.4 million species have been identified worldwide and estimates of total global species 
diversity range from 5 to 100 million. See William K. Stevens, Species Loss: Crisis of False 
Alarm?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,1991, at C1, C8. 
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cent of the photosynthetic energy produced by land plants.4 Human 
population, currently at 5.6 billion, is projected by the United Nations 
to more than double by the middle of the next century.5 
Along with these problems has come an attempt to reconceptualize 
humans' relationship to other life forms in moral terms by developing 
what is often called an "environmental ethic."6 Perhaps the first to 
articulate the need for such a "land ethic" was Aldo Leopold,7 who in 
1949 wrote: 
The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community 
to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the 
land. 
In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from 
conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of 
it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for 
the community as such.8 
Without such a land ethic, Leopold contends, we will not be able to 
heal our relationship to the earth: 
Conservation is getting nowhere because it is incompatible with 
our Abrahamic concept ofland. We abuse land because we regard 
it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a commu-
nity to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and 
respect. There is no other way for land to survive the impact of 
mechanized man, nor for us to reap from it the esthetic harvest it 
is capable, under science, of contributing to culture.9 
This Article uses an environmental ethic to evaluate recent changes 
in intellectual property protection for biotechnology. Biotechnology-
or "life technology" -is a particularly fruitful and appropriate subject 
of analysis for an ethic founded on respect for life.lO Questions about 
the ownership of the fruits of biotechnology should be of special 
4 See PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, HEALING THE PLANET 34 (1991); see also 
WILSON, supra note 1, at 272. Humans appropriate this photosynthetic energy which powers 
virtually all living organisms on the planet by consuming plants directly or through animal 
intermediaries, by reducing the energy as with the clearing of tropical forests for pasture lands, 
or by destroying the energy as with the construction of parking lots and shopping malls. 
5 LESTER BROWN, ET AL., STATE OF THE WORLD, 1994: A WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE REPORT 
ON PROGRESS TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 7 (1994). 
6 The academic, philosophical version of this attempt is represented by the journal Environ-
mental Ethics, now in its seventeenth year of publication. 
7 Precursors to Leopold include Henry David Thoreau and John Muir. For a useful history of 
environmental ethics, see RODERICK NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE (1989). 
8 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 204 (1987). 
9 [d. at viii. 
10 Biotechnology is of growing economic importance. By the turn of the century, annual sales 
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concern for those who, like Leopold, think conceptualizing the earth 
and its life forms as commodities must be resisted if humans are to 
find a proper place in the earth's community of life. Relying on this 
respect for life ethic and also on a philosophical analysis of justifica-
tions for intellectual property, this Article questions the appropriate-
ness and desirability of human societies issuing patents in organisms 
and genes. 
Section II examines the benefits and significance of biotechnology 
and traces troubling recent changes in biotechnology patent practice. 
Section III evaluates three rationales for intellectual property that 
may be used in defense of biotechnology patents. They are (1) the 
natural entitlements to the fruits of labor rationale, (2) the desert 
rationale, and (3) the consequentialist-incentive rationale. Section IV 
examines the costs and risks of biotechnology. Section V explores the 
negative impacts of biotechnology patents themselves. Section VI 
offers some conclusions. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 
PATENTS 
A. A Flurry of Biotechnology Patents 
In 1987, the United States Commissioner of Patents announced that 
"the Patent and Trademark Office now considers nonnaturally occur-
ing nonhuman multicellular living organisms, including animals, to be 
patentable subject matter."ll The Commissioner was simply following 
the Supreme Court's lead. In allowing the patenting of a genetically-
altered oil-eating bacterium seven years earlier, the Court claimed 
Congress intended patentable subject matter to "include anything 
under the sun that is made by man."12 "Utility patents"13 for plants 
worldwide of products produced using recombinant DNA technology alone is projected to 
exceed $40 billion. See J. Leslie Glick, The Industrial Impact of the Biological Revolution, in 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE, 364 (Albert H. Teich ed., 5th ed. 1990). 
11 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. No. OTA-BA-370, NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENTING LIFE-SPECIAL REPORT, 93 (1989) [herein-
after NEW DEVELOPMENTS]. 
12 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), reprinted in, PROPERTY: CASES, CON-
CEPTS, CRITIQUES 5-8 (Lawrence Becker & Kenneth Kipnis, eds. 1984) (quotation from p. 7). 
Notice that the Patent and Trademark Office was more circumspect than was the Court: the 
Patent and Trademark Office excluded human organisms from patentable subject matter. Id. 
Human organisms are, after all, "made by man" and woman. 
13 Utility patents are the ordinary type of patent issued for inventions of processes, machines, 
manufactures, and compositions of matter. Thomas Edison received such a patent for the light 
bulb. There are other, more specific, types of patents, including "plant patents" which are legal 
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came next,14 and by the end of the decade Harvard University re-
ceived the first patent on animal life. Its patent was for a mouse 
genetically altered to be susceptible to breast cancer.15 As the pro-
ject's major sponsor, Du Pont possesses commercial rights and the 
chemical company is selling the patented research specimen for fifty 
dollars apiece.16 The Patent and Trademark Office has recently issued 
three additional patents on types of animals, all for mice to be used in 
biomedical research.17 
Although human organisms have not been patented,18 human ma-
terial routinely is patented.19 One particularly controversial example 
is the University of California at Los Angeles's patent of a cell line 
instruments prohibiting the asexual reproduction of protected plant varieties. See infra note 59 
and accompanying text. 
14 Kenneth Hibberd received a patent for a variety of com that contained a high level of an 
amino acid and whose progeny did as well. For a discussion of this patent, see R.S. CRESPI, 
PATENTS: A BASIC GUIDE TO PATENTING IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 113 (1988). 
15 The "oncomouse," as it is known, was developed by Harvard researchers Philip Leder and 
Timothy Stewart. See SHELDON KRIMSKY, BIOTECHNICS AND SOCIETY: THE RISE OF INDUS-
TRIAL GENETICS 44-45 (1991). 
16 See Elizabeth Corcoran, A Tiny Mouse Came Forth, SCI. AM., Feb. 1989, at 73. 
17 The patents are for mice altered to develop enlarged prostate glands, which is a disorder 
that frequently occurs in male humans; for mice that fail to develop fully functioning immune 
systems; and for mice altered to constantly produce a protein that attacks viruses and helps 
prevent infection. Over 180 applications for animal patents are being reviewed by the Patent 
and Trademark Office. See The Associated Press, U.S. Patents Are Granted for Three Labora-
tory Mice, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1992, at A4; see also Edmund Andrews, US Resumes Granting 
Patents on Genetically Altered Animals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,1993, at AI. By beginning with 
patents on mice used to study human disease, the Patent and Trademark Office has succeeded 
in dampening public opposition to animal patenting. People are particularly unsympathetic 
toward "rats," and research that has real promise for curing human disease is the most likely 
of any harmful uses of animals to be morally justifiable. Experimental use of animals is also the 
closest we come to treating animals as tools and so animal patents seem the least inappropriate 
in this context. What would the public and Congressional reactions have been if the first animal 
patents were for varieties of dogs or horses? 
18 The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) remarks that patent "claims directed to or 
including a human being will not be considered," because owning human beings is prohibited by 
the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution which banned human slavery. See NEW DEVEL-
OPMENTS, supra note 11, at 22, 24. This, however, does not definitively settle the question of 
patents on human organisms. One commentator asks, "[s]ince cloned human embryos are not 
persons protected by the Constitution and theoretically at least could be as 'immortal' as cloned 
cell lines, could a particularly 'novel' and 'useful' human embryo be patented, cloned and sold?" 
See George J. Annas, Of Monkeys, Man, and Oysters, 17 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1987, 
at 20, 22. Furthermore, given that patents on animals containing human genes are permitted, 
will we allow patents on human-animal hybrids? For discussion, see Rachel E. Fishman, Pat-
enting Human Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures Deserve Constitutional Protection?, 15 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 461, 461--82 (1989). See also generally Michael D. Rivard, Toward A General Theory 
of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhoodfor Transgenic Human-
oid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425 (1992). 
19 A well-known analyst of patents in biotechnology claims that the practice of patenting 
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produced from a spleen removed from a Leukemia patient named 
John Moore.20 Although the commercial potential of the pharmaceuti-
cals that this cell line can produce is several billion dollars, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has ruled that Moore has no ownership inter-
ests in these cells after they have been removed from his body.21 In 
addition, a biotechnology company has patented human bone marrow 
"stem cells," thereby obtaining a monopoly on their commercial use.22 
The National Institutes of Health's (NIH) attempt to patent several 
thousand gene-fragments constituting about five percent of the hu-
man genome is another example of this frenzy for life patents.23 Al-
though the Patent and Trademark Office rejected NIH's applications, 
other more careful patent applications on human genes have been and 
will continue to be granted.24 The environmental and international 
political significance of the biotechnology patenting issue is clear from 
the United States' refusal to sign the biodiversity treaty during the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio 
De Janeiro in 1992 because of perceived inadequacies in the treaty's 
handling of biotechnology patenting rights and royalties.25 
human genetic material is "commonplace and raises no moral issue." R.S. Crespi, The Patenting 
of Genetic Resources, 158 IMPACT OF SCI. ON SOC'y 175, 183 (1992). 
20 For useful discussions of this case, see Carl Cranor, Patenting Body Parts: A Sketch of 
Some Moral Issues, in OWNING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, 200-12 (Vivian 
Wei! & John Snapper eds. 1989), and see George J. Annas, Outrageous Fortune: Selling Other 
People's Cells, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. Nov.lDec. 1990, at 36, 36-39. 
21 Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479, 488-93, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 
(Cal. 1990). 
22 The company developed a procedure to isolate a pure strain of the stem cells and received 
a patent not only in the particular process for isolating them, but in the stem cells themselves: 
no one can use stem cells commercially without getting a license from SyStemix, even if they 
come up with a new way to obtain the cells. See Shannon Brownlee, Staking Claims on the 
Human Body, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 18, 1991, at 89. 
23 See Leslie Roberts, NIH Gene Patents, Round Two, 255 SCIENCE 912, 912-13 (1992); 
Edmund L. Andrews, Dr. Healy's Big Push on Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at F12. 
24 The Patent and Trademark Office rejected the National Institute for Health's (NIH's) 
patent applications because the gene fragments were neither novel-NIH had taken them from 
existing DNA libraries-nor useful in themselves. Although the fragments allow for the iden-
tification of complete genes, the genes' functions were unknown. They also found NIH's pro-
posed ''inventions'' obvious. Thus, NIH had failed to satisfy any of the three criteria for 
patenting: novelty, utility, and nonobviousness. See Intellectual Property, Obviously Not, THE 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 3,1992,90,90-91. Under a new director, the NIH has decided not to appeal 
this ruling and has withdrawn its patent applications for an additional four thousand human 
gene-fragments. See Natalie Angier, U.S. Dropping Its Efforts to Patent Thousands of Genetic 
Fragments, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, at A16. 
25 See Stanley P. Johnson, THE EARTH SUMMIT: THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON 
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) 81 (1993); see also Policing Thoughts, THE 
ECONOMIST, Aug. 22,1992, at 55. In a reversal of the Bush Administration's decision, the Clinton 
Administration has signed the biodiversity treaty. The United States Senate, however, has not 
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B. Biotechnology's Benefits and Significance 
The new biotechnologies promise a lot; in some cases they have 
already delivered. Medical benefits of biotechnology include the de-
velopment of new drugs and enhanced production of old drugs that 
combat cancer, A.I.D.S., dwarfism, diabetes, hepatitis, and even ag-
ing.26 Genetically-altered pigs produce human hemoglobin that might 
be used to develop a human blood substitute.27 Genetically-altered 
mice produce an extractable protein in their milk that dissolves blood 
clots.28 Both creatures exemplify a trend toward turning animals into 
living drug factories. The new biotechnologies also make it easier to 
identify genetically-caused diseases and permit the replacement of 
defective genes.29 Ultimately, such technology will allow us to choose 
our children's genetic makeup. 
In agriculture, biotechnicians have altered plants and animals for 
improved nutritional value. Biotechnicians have produced potatoes 
with more starch30 and pigs with an increased protein-to-fat ratio.31 
Researchers are also attempting to produce larger, faster growing, 
and more productive agricultural animals that require less feed.32 
Biotechnicians are already altering plants to withstand pests and 
disease, and they hope to be able to produce plants that fix their own 
nitrogen and resist drought and cold.33 The first genetically-altered 
whole food-product has recently appeared on supermarket shelves in 
the form of a tomato that spoils less quickly than unaltered tomatoes.34 
yet ratified it. For discussion, see the editorial Biodiversity Pact on the Ropes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 26, 1994, at A16. 
26 See KRIMSKY, supra note 15, at 223; Glick, supra note 10, at 359. 
27 See Philip J. Hilts, Gene-Altered Pigs Produce Key Part of Human Blood, N.Y. TIMES, June 
16, 1991, at AI. 
28 See Lisa J. Raines, The Mouse That Roared: Patent Protection for Genetically Engineered 
Animals Makes Legal, Moral, and Economic Sense, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Summer 1988, at 64, 
65. 
29 Gene therapy has been approved on an experimental basis for somatic cells. The future 
promises germ-line gene therapy, alterations that will be passed on to future generations. See 
Leslie Roberts, Ethical Questions Haunt New Genetic Technologies, 243 SCIENCE 1134, 1154 
(1989). 
30 See David M. Stark et al., Regulation of the Amount of Starch in Plant Tissues by ADP 
Glucose Pyrophosphorylase, 258 SCIENCE 287, 287-92 (1992). 
31 Henry J. Miller, Patenting Animals, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Winter 1988-89, at 24, 24. 
32 Experiments are also under way to make chickens and pigs with flesh more suitable for 
microwaving. See Kathleen Hart, Making Mythicai Monsters, THE PROGRESSIVE, March 1990, 
at 22. 
33 William K. Stevens, Bioengineering Points to Better Rice Plant, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1990, 
at CI. 
34 For a description of Calgene Inc.'s Flavr Savr tomato, see Union of Concerned Scientists, 
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These developments raise hopes for an increase in the world's food 
supply and a decrease in the use of chemicals in agriculture.35 
Genetically-altered microbes that eat toxic wastes and degrade 
synthetic compounds may be useful in waste treatment.36 Genetic 
technologies can help preserve endangered species.37 Biotechnology 
even provides economic incentives for preservation, as it makes pos-
sible commercial uses of genetic material that previously lacked eco-
nomic value.38 Biotechnologies could lessen human dependence on 
other forms of sentient life by providing genetically altered, insen-
tient life-forms as substitutes. 
Biotechnology is an old technology. The use of living organisms to 
make bread, wine, and cheese is a longstanding human practice. Peo-
ple have "genetically-engineered" plants and animals, including hu-
mans, by selective breeding for desirable characteristics for thou-
sands of years.39 
I t is sometimes suggested that the new biotechnologies40 are not 
radical departures from these historical practices. One defender of 
biotechnology claims that "centuries of selective breeding have al-
tered domestic animals far more than the next several decades of 
transgenic modifications are expected to alter them."41 Another of 
biotechnology's defenders argues that nature routinely reshuffles ge-
netic material by combining genes in new ways during sexual repro-
FDA Approves the Calgene Tomato, No Labeling Required, THE GENE EXCHANGE, June 1994, 
at 1. 
35 See KRIMSKY, supra note 15, at 88-89; Stevens, supra note 33, at C1. 
36 Id. 
37 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. No. OTA-F-330, TECH-
NOLOGIES TO MAINTAIN BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (1987). 
38 See generally Roger Sedjo, Property Rights, Genetic Resources, and Biotechnological 
Change, 35 J.L. & ECON. 199, 199-213 (1992). 
39 See ANDREW GOUDIE, THE HUMAN IMPACT ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 15-20 (4th 
ed. 1990). 
40 Recombinant DNA techniques are perhaps the most exciting of the new biotechnologies 
and certainly are what has attracted the most popular attention. Recombinant DNA techniques 
include gene identification, isolation, splicing, cloning, chemical synthesis, and insertion into 
already existing organisms to produce desirable, heritable traits. Significant advances have also 
been made in tissue and cell culture techniques, including the production of "immortal" cell lines 
and the fusion of cells from different sources; the creation of storage technologies that involve 
freezing cells or embryos and successful thawing decades later; and the production of pure and 
high concentrations of various biological agents, for example, antibodies. For a description of 
these technologies, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. No. 
OTA-BA-337, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND 
CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT (1987). 
41 Reid G. Adler, Controlling the Applications of Biotechnology: A Critical Analysis of the 
Proposed Moratorium on Animal Patenting, 1 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20 n.126 (1988). 
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duction, by altering genes through mutations, and by transferring 
foreign genes into already existing organisms.42 
Still, there are notable differences between contemporary biotech-
nologies and both past human practice and what nature does by itself. 
Recent techniques for genetic manipulation are much faster and far 
more precise than is traditional, whole-organism crossbreeding.43 
Modern biotechnicians can produce organisms that possess specific 
desirable characteristics, while traditional, whole-organism cross-
breeders produce organisms with a variety of new traits, many of 
which are undesirable and difficult to breed out.44 While selective 
breeding necessarily takes place within a species or closely-related 
species, the new biotechnologies permit the combination of genetic 
material from significantly different species. Consider, for example, 
the sheep-goat chimeras produced from mixing the embryonic cells of 
goats and sheep.45 Genes can also be moved directly between the plant 
and animal kingdoms, something nature never does.46 For example, 
tobacco plants have been made to glow after a firefly gene was in-
serted into them.47 
42 Raines, supra note 28, at 67. 
43 NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 13. 
44Id. 
45 Produced at the University of Wyoming, these "geeps" have the horns of a goat and a 
sheep's body. See What Do You Get If You Cross . .. ?, THE ECONOMIST, Aug 15, 1987, at 67-68; 
Keith Schneider, Where There Can Be a Patent on Life, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1987, at A10. 
46 One commentator speCUlates on the basis of similarity between genes that genes have 
moved between the plant and animal kingdoms without human assistance. There is no sugges-
tion, however, that this movement was direct rather than a slow migration. See Winston J. Brill, 
Why Engineered Organisms Are Safe, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Spring 1988, at 44, 47. Stephen 
Jay Gould thinks our new ability to move genes around is unique: 
Evolution has a definite geometry .... Lineages split and diverge like the branches 
of a tree. A species, once distinct, is permanently on its own; the branches of life do 
not coalesce .... Biotechnology ... place[s] genes of one species into the program of 
another, thereby combining what nature has kept separate from time immemorial. ... 
What are the consequences, ethical, aesthetic, and practical, of altering life's fundamen-
tal geometry and permitting one species to design new creatures at will, combining 
bits and pieces of lineages distinct for billions of years? 
Steven Jay Gould, On the Origin of Specious Critics, DISCOVER, Jan. 6, 1985, at 34, 34. 
47 See CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 400. Consider another example: 
The first genetically engineered plant to be approved for field-testing in the United 
States ... was a herbicide-tolerant tobacco strain constructed using genetic material 
from a bacterium (a Salmonella species that had become resistant to the herbicide), 
controlled by additional genetic sequences from a mammal (sheep) and another plant 
(soybean) unrelated to tobacco, all inserted using a second species of bacterium [Agro-
bacterium]. 
Robert K. Colwell, Natural and Unnatural History: Biological Diversity and Genetic Engi-
neering, in SCIENTISTS AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES 1, 9 (William R. Shea & Beat Sitter eds. 
1989) (citation omitted). 
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These techniques allow genes to be synthesized "from scratch" 
using "gene machines" that "can string together the building blocks 
of DNA in any specified order."48 One analyst predicts that the 
biotechnology industry will in the near future move beyond mimick-
ing nature to the production of novel genes and gene products that 
have never before existed in nature.49 The novelty of these new 
biotechnologies has been summed up thus: "While dramatic changes 
in organisms or progeny can be induced chemically, surgically, by 
controlling the environment, or controlling breeding, the potential of 
these agents of change remains a subset of the prospects opened up 
through genetic manipUlation, which in principle permits all possible 
biological changes to be actualized."50 
Some commentators suggest that the changes in the planet result-
ing from the creation, use, and release of biotechnical products could 
dwarf the changes that have resulted from the use of petrochemical 
products.51 The World Resources Institute sees genetic material as 
the "oil of the Information Age."52 "Natural resources are going to 
matter less," says one commentator, "the real action is going to be in 
the gathering of genes."53 Another sees modern biotechnology as re-
sulting in "the second end of nature," and finds great significance in 
this manipulation of nature "from the inside out."54 A well-respected 
biologist suggests that "our descendants may see the present period 
as the beginning of a massive reshuffling, under human direction, of 
the 'evolutionary inventions' that 3,000 million years of natural selec-
tion have produced in the earth's biota."55 Given the significance of 
these new biological techniques, the decisions we make about biotech-
48 John M. Czarnetzky, Altering Nature's Blueprints for Profit: Patenting Multicellular Ani-
mals, 74 VA. L. REV. 1327, 1333 n.26 (1988). 
49 Glick, supra note 10, at 363. Biologist Thomas Eisner of Cornell University takes a more 
sober view: "The future lies not in biotechnology's power to create new life forms, but in finding 
and preserving what already surrounds us .... We don't know enough to design compounds 
from scratch for this or that disease .... We've neglected the surefire approach, which is to look 
to nature." Joel Ray, Good Chemistry, 15 THE AMICUS J., Spring 1993, at 18, 18. 
50 Benjamin Freedman & Marie-Claude Goulet, New Creations? Commentary, 21 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Jan./Feb. 1991, at 34, 35. 
51 Jeremy Rifkin, Creating the Efficient Gene, in PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 222, 223 (Michael 
Ruse ed., 1989). 
52 See Jack Kloppenburg, No Hunting: Scientific Poaching and Global Biodiversity, Z MAGA-
ZINE, Sept. 1990, at 104. 
53 Attributed to Jack Doyle. See Ward Sinclair, Jack Doyle: A Warning Voice Amid the 
Biogenetic Revolution, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1987, at A9; see also JACK DOYLE, ALTERED 
HARVEST: AGRICULTURE, GENETICS, AND THE FATE OF THE WORLD'S FOOD SUPPLY 21 (1985). 
54 BILL McKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE 162 (1989). McKibben sees global climate change 
as the first "end of nature." See id. at 7-8. 
55 Colwell, supra note 47, at 27. 
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nology will have serious ethical, social, and environmental implica-
tions. 
C. The New Biotechnology Patents as a Significant Change from 
Past Patenting Practice 
Proponents of biotechnology patenting suggest that the new 
biotechnology patents, or "biopatents," are minor and logical exten-
sions from past practice, not radical revisions.56 Proponents claim that 
the puzzlement, shock, and outrage often expressed when people first 
become aware of the patenting of animals and human genes are inap-
propriate if such patents are understood in proper historical and 
economic context.57 Proponents point out that patents on biotechnical 
process such as fermentation have been issued in the United States 
since the early 1800S.58 In addition, Congress passed a Plant Patent 
Act (PPA) in 1930,59 as well as the Plant Variety Protection Act 
(PVPA) in 1970,60 and both provide for patent-like protection for new 
types of plants. 
56 See, e.g., Raines, supra note 28, at 65-68. 
57 See generally Adler, supra note 41, at 1--61; Crespi, supra note 19. 
58 One such patent, issued to Louis Pasteur in 1873, included a claim for a yeast as an article 
of manufacture. This suggests that Chakrabarty's 1980 patent was not the first patent on an 
organism per se. Pasteur's yeast patent, however, was an anomaly. Prior to the Chakrabarty 
decision, the Patent Office would not issue patents for living organisms themselves independent 
of their use, but only for compositions containing living things, such as waste disposal systems 
containing bacteria. See P.J. Federico, Louis Pasteur's Patents, 327 SCIENCE 86, 86 (1937); see 
also NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 7, 31, 51. 
59 Plant Patent Act, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 804 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 
(1988». At the time, plants appeared to be unsuitable for utility patent protection. In response 
to industry pressure, Congress enacted the Plant Patent Act (PPA) as an alternative mechanism 
to stimulate the plant breeding industry. The PPA protects against only the unauthorized 
asexual reproduction of plants; for example, by rooting clippings. For useful discussions of the 
history behind both the PPA and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), and their differences 
from the new utility patents for plants, see Glenn Bugos & Daniel Kevles, Plants as Intellectual 
Property: American Practice, Law, and Policy in World Context, HUMANITIES WORKING 
PAPER 1944 (Pasadena, CA: Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of 
Technology, October 1991), and see generally Frederick H. Buttel & Jill Belsky, Biotechnology, 
Plant Breeding, and Intellectual Property: Social and Ethical Dimensions, in OWNING SCIEN-
TIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 110, 110--39 (Vivian Weil & John Snapper eds. 1989). For 
a useful chart summarizing the differences between the PPA, the PVPA, and utility biopatents, 
see NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 12. 
60 Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as amended 
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This act is administered by the United States 
Department of Agriculture rather than the Patent Office (which administers utility patents and 
plant patents). 7 U.S.C. § 2321. The Act provides for the issuance of "certificates of protection 
to breeders" not "patents to inventors," and it protects against both sexual and asexual repro-
duction of plants. Id. §§ 2481-2483. 
1995] BIOTECH PATENTS 277 
Although there has been a steady trend in this century toward 
privatizing biological material, the recent biopatents are a significant 
and troubling change. These new utility patents provide far more 
aggressive property rights in biological entities than have previously 
existed. 
Utility patents treat any type ofliving being-other than persons-
as patentable subject matter.61 In addition to organisms, one can pat-
ent as products organism parts, such as flowers, fruits, seeds, and 
fertilized eggs.62 Genes and other DNA63 can be patented, whether 
natural, recombinant, or synthetic.64 Cells and cell lines can be pat-
ented,65 as well as gene and cell products, such as proteins and anti-
bodies.66 One can also patent specific uses of any biological agent, 
whether the agent is novel or preexisting.67 Examples are patenting 
a bacterium for use as an insecticide or human stem cells to treat 
disease. Additionally, biotechnical processes for manipulating these 
biological materials and organisms, such as gene-splicing techniques, 
can be patented.68 
Utility patents are not restricted to a specific type of organism, such 
as red-delicious apple trees, as is the case under the PPA and the 
PVPA.69 Utility patents can establish property rights in broad classes 
of organisms in radically different species as long as the organisms 
have the same traits and functional properties.70 Harvard's oncomouse 
patent is actually an "oncomammal" patent.71 Harvard owns any 
mammal with any recombinant, cancer-causing gene-and there are 
about forty known-inserted into the mammal or its ancestors at an 
61 See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text. 
62 NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 76. 
63 Ninety-five percent of human DNA does not code for genes. But this nongenetic DNA, as 
well as parts of genes, can be useful in, for example, identifying genes. See Crespi, supra note 
19, at 183. 
64 Id. at 178-81. 
65 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
66 See Lisa J. Raines, Protecting Biotechnology's Pioneers, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Winter 
1991-92, at 33, 34; see also NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 56. 
67 See NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 61; Crespi, supra note 19, at 176. 
68 See Raines, supra note 66, at 35. 
69 For PPA, see PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, MANUAL 
OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1610 (5th ed. rev. 1993). For PVPA, see 7 U.S.C. § 2541 
(1988), where infringement is specified in such a way that only the new variety is protected. See 
also NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 72, 73, 76. 
70 See Czarnetzky, supra note 48, at 1354, 1358. 
71 Harvard received a patent for "any transgenic nonhuman mammal all of whose germ cells 
and somatic cells contain a recombinant activated oncogene sequence introduced into said 
mammal, or an ancestor of said mammal, at an embryonic stage." See NEW DEVELOPMENTS, 
supra note 11, at 99 (quoting from U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866). 
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embryonic stage.72 Thus, biotechnicians can patent organism-types 
that they have never actually produced.73 
Furthermore, utility patents prohibit farmers from the common 
practice of saving and using seeds from previous crops or from breed-
ing animals.74 Generally, utility patents allow any organism-patent 
holder to prohibit those to whom they sell the organism from breeding 
it, whether the buyer be a farmer, family, or researcher.75 Utility 
patents also lack a research exemption that is present under PPA and 
PVPA, thus erecting a barrier to further innovation.76 
III. RATIONALES IN DEFENSE OF BIOPATENTS 
A. The Need for Justifying Biopatents 
The legal changes in biotechnology patenting during the last fifteen 
years are not minor and logical extensions of past practice. Rather, 
they are brazen forays into unchartered moral, legal, social, and en-
vironmental territory. The new biopatents constitute a significant 
change in society's relation to living beings, including ourselves. Ques-
tions of justification loom large. We cannot simply assume the permis-
sibility and appropriateness of such patents because of our longstand-
ing practice of issuing quasi-patents on certain types of plant 
72 See Corcoran, supra note 16, at 73. 
73 How broad a utility patent claim can legitimately be depends on the extent to which the 
patented idea "could reasonably be expected to work more broadly than has been demonstrated 
in the examples of the patent disclosure." See John H. Barton, Patenting Life, SCI. AM., Mar. 
1991, at 40, 44. In the three most recent mouse-type patents, the Patent Office allowed patenting 
only of the particular species altered. See Sally Lehrman, Ruling Narrows US View of Animal 
Patents, 361 NATURE 103, 103 (1993). 
74 To prevent patent infringement by buyers breeding their own oncomice, Du Pont had 
considered selling only one sex or sterilizing the mice it sells. In the end, Du Pont decided to 
rely on the honor system. They will write to the buyers of oncomice who reproduce them-and 
presumably to those who produce oncomammals of any sort-and request a user's licensing fee. 
See Corcoran, supra note 16, at 73. 
76 Selling patented organisms is also to sell a means by which the buyer can infringe the 
patent, at least when the organisms self-replicate "true-to-type." Asexual reproduction-be-
cause it produces genetically identical offspring-would always infringe the patent. With sexual 
reproduction, allele swapping may result in an offspring lacking the patented features, and thus 
patent infringement mayor may not occur. For a discussion, see Robert G. Zimbelman, Patent-
ing Animals, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Winter 1988--89, at 26, 26. 
76 Unlike the PPA and the PVPA, utility patent statutes prohibit the use of patented organ-
isms for experimental breeding and research. Most other nations have such a research exemp-
tion. The only exemption under the United States patent statutes is case law that allows for 
experimentation to satisfy academic curiosity; experimentation for commercial purposes is not 
allowed. One commentator sees this as "unfortunate" and argues that progress and science are 
best served if all laboratories, including commercial ones, have the right to experiment freely 
with patented organisms. See Barton, supra note 73, at 43-44. 
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innovations. This section, therefore, evaluates potential justifications 
for these new biopatents. 
There exists another reason why the need for justifying biopatents 
is particularly poignant. Intellectual property, such as biopatents in 
oncomammals, unlike tangible property, such as wrist watches, is 
nonexclusive.77 Researchers throughout the world could use Du Pont's 
oncomammals. Whereas with tangible property, one person's use ex-
cludes others from using the property. Thus, intellectual property 
faces a special burden of justification not shared by justifications for 
owning tangible property. It is prima facie irrational for society to 
grant monopoly rights to something that all could use at once.78 
Without intellectual property, market incentives may not work ade-
quately to stimulate the production of innovations. Because of this, 
the burden of justification against monopoly rights in nonexclusive 
objects brings with it a prima facie case in favor of public funding for 
innovation. Thus, the defender of biopatents has a special burden of 
proof to show that such monopoly rights are acceptable, while the 
defender of public funding for biotechnology invention holds a position 
with initial plausibility that needs to be defeated if biopatents are to 
be justified. 
B. The Natural Entitlement to the Fruits of Labor Rationale 
One justification often used in favor of property rights in general 
is that people are naturally entitled to the fruits of their labor. This 
originally Lockean argument boils down to the intuition: I made it and 
hence it is mine; it would not have existed but for me.79 Both philoso-
phers and the United States Congress's Office of Technology Assess-
ment have appealed to this argument to defend biopatents.80 
77 For a fuller treatment, see Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 31, ~5 (1989). 
78 By establishing a monopoly in types of self-replicating entities, organism patents are 
especially wasteful. In controlling access to the organism type, the patent owner also controls 
a means of producing more instances of the organism. Issuing organism patents is analogous to 
giving someone a copyright in a song and at the same time a patent in an audio-copying machine 
designed to duplicate that song. 
79 For the original statement of the argument that laborers are naturally entitled to the fruits 
of their labor, see JOHN LocKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LE'ITER 
CONCERNING ToLERATION ch. 5 (J.W. Gough ed., 3d ed. 1966). For a useful summary and 
interpretation of various strands of Locke's labor argument for property, see Lawrence Becker, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS ch. 4 (1977). 
80 Baruch Brody uses this rationale in defense of patenting transgenic animals. Although 
Brody's main argument is that animal patents stimulate useful, animal-related inventions, he 
also says that "these consequentialist considerations may be reinforceable by an appeal to 
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But patents and the market value of patents are socially-con-
structed phenomena created by the legal system, enforcement mecha-
nisms, and the demand of others. The laborer did not create the patent 
or its market value, and thus she cannot be naturally entitled to either 
as the fruits of her labor.s1 Labor may naturally entitle a person to 
possess and personally use the product of her labor. But it does not 
naturally entitle a person to exclude everyone else from using things 
of the same type as what she produced. This is precisely what a patent 
monopoly involves.82 
In the case of those whose labor involves the alteration of living 
beings, the natural entitlement to the fruits of labor rationale fails to 
justify a natural property right in even the particular organism ma-
nipulated. The relationship between an inventor and the mechanical 
device invented is different in morally significant ways from the rela-
tionship between a biotechnician and the organism altered. People 
who create physical objects may possess prima facie claims of natural 
entitlement to those objects. There is a plausible case for this natural 
entitlement if (1) the object would not have existed but for the indi-
vidual's productive activity, (2) the materials used were readily avail-
able to anyone, and (3) no other individual has a plausible claim of 
natural entitlement to the object. 
In contrast, those who manipulate living beings are not plausibly 
viewed as possessing natural property rights in those living beings. 
If anything is naturally entitled to a living organism, it is that organ-
ism itself. The right to use and benefit from one's body is a paradigm 
case of natural entitlement.~ John Moore,84 not his doctor, possesses 
a naturally and metaphysically grounded claim-an inherent property 
right-in the cells of his body. Similarly, other living beings come into 
the world with a claim to use their physical characteristics for their 
patents as a way of satisfying the inventor's entitlements to the fruits of his or her labor." See 
Should We Allow The Patenting of Life?, AGRIC. BIOETHICS F. (Iowa State Univ.), Aug. 1991, 
at 4. For the Office of Technology Assessment's appeal to the natural entitlement argument, see 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 130. 
81 For a fuller development of this argument, see Hettinger, supra note 77, at 36-40. 
82 Are people naturally entitled to sell the particular instance of their innovation-for exam-
ple, the individual organism that has been genetically altered-under a licensing agreement that 
prohibits the purchaser from revealing the innovation to others or from reproducing or selling 
it? Once we ask whether society should enforce such agreements, we see that the question is 
not one of individual natural rights, but of social policy. See Hettinger, supra note 77, at 39 n.21. 
83 When Locke argued for a natural property right in the fruits oflabor, he did so by starting 
from the assumption that we have a natural property right in our own bodies and then extending 
this right first to the activity of our bodies-that is, our labor-and second to the fruits of this 
activity. See LocKE, supra note 79, at ch. 5, ,. 27. 
84 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
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benefit. The DNA in a bacterial cell naturally belongs to that bacte-
rium and not to the researcher; the trunk of a tree is something to 
which the tree, not the lumber company, is naturally entitled; the calf, 
not the rancher, naturally owns the flesh of its body.85 
I do not deny that humans may legitimately own organisms in 
certain senses. For example, in order to acknowledge that people have 
special claims and responsibilities to determine what happens to cer-
tain organisms, talk of ownership rights is appropriate. A person has 
rights and responsibilities to determine what happens to her dog or 
her child that are not possessed by others. However, I do deny the 
appropriateness of the idea of owning organisms in the way that 
people own their bodies or in the way that artificers own created 
utilitarian artifacts. A human body exists as a manifestation of a 
person and, in this sense, exists for the use of that person. A utilitar-
ian artifact exists to serve the purposes of its creator or users. But 
an organism and its parts are not appropriately understood as exist-
ing solely to serve the purposes of its human owner. The charac-
teristics of an organism are not things that people may use for their 
benefit without also considering the possible conflicting benefits those 
characteristics provide the organism. There is moral dimension in 
determining what people may do with organisms because the inter-
ests of the owned organism must be considered in this decision. Thus, 
people are not naturally entitled to use an organism as they please. 
These points hold true even when humans cause the organism's ex-
istence or have manipulated its characteristics. 
1. Biocentrism and Patenting Organisms 
A full development of this argument requires a defense of the 
environmental ethic known as "biocentrism." As I will use the phrase, 
biocentrism holds that all living beings possess morally-considerable 
interests that we ought to respect. This Schweitzerian86 ideal of re-
85 What if a biotechnician chemically synthesizes DNA and then inserts it into an organism? 
In such a case, the DNA does not naturally belong to the receiving organism and-at least prior 
to insertion-would seem to naturally belong to the biotechnician. Once the organism begins to 
use the DNA for its own benefit, questions of natural ownership become unclear. In any case, 
as Robert Nozick has pointed out, mixing what you own with something you do not own does 
not obviously result in ownership of the mixture. See ROBERT N OZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND 
UTOPIA 174-75 (1974). 
86 1952 Nobel Peace Prize winner and Swiss physician Albert Schweitzer may be the most 
well known proponent of biocentrism. For Schweitzer's defense of what he called "reverence 
for life," see his THE PHILOSOPHY OF CIVILIZATION 240-64 (Am. ed. 1950). 
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spect for all life has had many recent philosophical defenses.87 I will 
only briefly sketch the argument.88 
All organisms possess individual welfares served by their physical 
features. Unlike artifacts such as gene sequencing machines, inani-
mate natural substances such as chemical compounds, or parts of 
organisms such as genes or cells, living beings possess goods of their 
own or welfare interests, and thus may be benefited or harmed with-
out reference to the good of any other being. For example, crushing 
the roots of a tree with a bulldozer harms the tree itself; this is a 
setback for the tree's welfare and is not bad simply for the interests 
of the homeowner who wants the tree's shade. 
Despite possessing artificial features programmed into them by 
biotechnicians to serve human purposes, genetically-altered organ-
isms possess numerous original genetic traits and consequent biologi-
cal systems whose proper functioning constitutes their good. For 
example, the proper functioning of the system that allows a tobacco 
plant to glow in the dark-after a firefly gene has been inserted into 
it-does not specify the plant's own good. However, the proper func-
tioning of the tobacco plant's water transport system and its photo-
synthetic ability continue to be goods of the tobacco plant itself, in 
addition to being good for the farmer. 
That all organisms possess goods of their own does not by itself 
show that people have prima facie duties to respect organisms' wel-
fare.89 Nonetheless, if the welfare interests of human beings ground 
prima facie duties prohibiting thwarting those interests-apart from 
87 See HOLMES ROLSTON III, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 94-126 (1988); PAUL w. TAYLOR, 
RESPECT FOR NATURE: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 14-25 (1986); Kenneth Good-
paster, On Being Morally Considerable, 75 J. PHIL. 308, 308-25 (1978). Joel Feinberg is perhaps 
the most prominent opponent of the claim that living beings such as plants and microbes have 
interests that we could morally consider. Feinberg does think that sentient animals have such 
interests. In addition to his earlier, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in PHI-
LOSOPHY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43-68 (William T. Blackstone ed. 1974), see gener-
ally 1 HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984). Feinberg has said 
that he has received more criticism for his view that plants do not have interests than for 
anything else he has written. Each of the works cited at the top of this footnote criticizes 
Feinberg's claim about plants. 
88 For what is perhaps the most careful defense to date of the claim that all and only living 
organisms have welfare interests that we should morally consider, see generally Gary E. Varner, 
Biological Functions and Biological Interests, 28 THE S. J. PHIL. 251-70 (1990). For an earlier 
discussion of some of the important ideas on which Varner relies, see generally Harley Cahen, 
Against the Moral Considerability of Ecosystems, 10 ENVTL. ETHICS 195, 195-216 (1988). 
89 For an argument that such a conclusion does not immediately follow, see TAYLOR supra 
note 87, at 71-72. John O'Neill argues that "one can recognize that something has its own goods, 
and quite consistently be morally indifferent to these goods." See John O'Neill, The Varieties of 
Intrinsic Value, 75 MONIST 119, 131-32 (1992). One way to establish a connection between value 
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any preference interests humans may have-9Othen the welfare inter-
ests of other organisms grounds such duties to them. 
Because all organisms-including genetically-altered ones-pos-
sess morally-considerable interests, organisms are not mere re-
sources that people are naturally entitled to own in the way people 
own their bodies or own artifacts.91 Thus, the rationale that justifies 
property rights on the grounds that an individual is naturally entitled 
to the fruits of her labor not only fails to justify patents in types of 
organisms, but also fails to properly specify the ownership relation-
ship between biotechnicians and the individual organisms they mod-
ify. Biotechnicians are not naturally entitled even to the individual 
organisms they manipulate. 
Advocates of animal patents appeal to the moral innocence of own-
ing individual animals in attempts to legitimize patenting animal-
types: 
Owning animals is legitimate and traditional in our culture, and 
human dominion over the animal kingdom is even a common bib-
lical theme. Animals are bought and sold daily, valued in the 
marketplace on the basis of their rarity and utility. We eat them, 
wear them, perform biomedical research on them, put them on 
leashes. As bioethicist LeRoy Walters of Georgetown University 
Kennedy Institute for Bioethics has suggested, patenting them 
"seems relatively benign."92 
But that certain ways of understanding human ownership of other 
individual organisms are morally unobjectionable does not entail that 
all such conceptions are appropriate. Nor does the legitimacy of cer-
tain types of ownership of individual organisms imply that patenting 
and obligation is to embrace a principle of nonmaleficence requiring moral agents to avoid 
causing a loss of value. 
90 Note that nutrition and water are good for a person whether or not that person is aware 
of these needs or cares about having them satisfied. Thus, an individual wanting its needs to be 
satisfied is not necessary for their satisfaction to be good for that individual. That a tree does 
not want or desire or care about getting nutrition or water does not show that these things fail 
to benefit it. More technically, welfare interests-that is, what is good for a being-----do not 
necessarily depend on preference interests-that is, what a being wants or prefers, if anything. 
91 It is incongruous to acknowledge that an organism has prima facie claims on us to respect 
its welfare while denying that it is naturally entitled to use its own body for its own benefit. If 
we grant, for example, that a tree has a morally considerable interest in getting water, how can 
we deny that it is naturally entitled to use its vascular cells for water transport and claim that 
we are naturally entitled to use it as lumber? This claim would be analogous to admitting that 
John Moore has a morally considerable need for the breakdown of old blood cells, but denying 
that he is naturally entitled to use his spleen for this purpose on the grounds that his doctors 
are naturally entitled to use his spleen cells for cancer research. See supra notes 20-21 and 
accompanying text. 
92 Raines, supra note 28, at 68. 
284 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:267 
organism-types is morally acceptable. An important theme in contem-
porary environmental philosophy and policy is that moral questions 
about treatment of kinds are different from-and often more serious 
than-questions about treatment ofindividuals.93 The special concern 
our society has with preserving endangered species illustrates this. 
There is no inconsistency in being comfortable with people owning 
individual blue spruces, for example, and being appalled by the idea 
of a person owning and monopolizing all blue spruces. 
That all organisms-including genetically-altered ones-possess 
morally-considerable interests and thus are not tools, instruments, or 
mere resources that people are naturally entitled to own explains why 
patenting organisms-types is not benign. A patent is a several-hun-
dred year old, legal and moral category developed for and applied to 
our relations with newly created inanimate-typically mechanical-
devices.94 People patent new tools that exist to serve human purposes. 
By allowing patenting of new organism-types, we inappropriately 
conceptualize such organisms as tools. This legally enshrines a mor-
ally mistaken way of thinking about our relation to these organisms.95 
Some readers may find the biocentric environmental ethic underly-
ing this argument unpersuasive.96 A more widely held-and easier to 
93 See ROLSTON, supra note 87, at 126-60, for an argument that concern with preserving 
species is far more important than concern for the lives of individual organisms. This nonindi-
vidualistic approach to the moral status of nonhumans is widespread in the literature and often 
goes by the name of "environmental holism." For another example, see generally J. BAIRD 
CALLICOTT, IN DEFENSE OF THE LAND ETHIC: ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 
(1989). 
94 The very language describing what is patentable subject matter expresses this. One can 
patent "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." See 35 
U.S.C. § 101 (1988). For some support of this interpretation of the patent institution, see LEON 
KAss, ToWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 128-53 (1985) 
(especially pp. 143-44). 
95 A Canadian court's bald-faced acceptance of the tool concept inherent in patenting was 
expressed in the following ruling: 
If an inventor creates a new and unobvious insect which did not exist before (and thus 
is not a product of nature), and can recreate it uniformly and at will, and it is useful 
(e.g., to destroy the spruce bud worm), then it is every bit as much a new tool of 
man as a micro-organism. 
quoted in David Vaver, Intellectual Property Today: Of Myths and Paradoxes, 30 (1989) (unpub-
lished manuscript, available from Vaver at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto) 
(emphasis added). Another explicit statement of the organism-as-tool idea can be found in 
Crespi, supra note 19, at 177: "Attempts were made to patent the micro-organisms themselves, 
these being seen as industrial tools or intermediates useful in the process of producing the final 
products for marketing." 
96 Some may even think biocentrism is absurd. Duties to individual, insentient organisms, such 
as a carrot plant, even if the duties are prima facie, overridable, and weak, may nonetheless 
seem beyond the pale. One philosopher argues in this spirit when he claims that "it is not the 
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defend-position on moral considerability is "sentientism," the view 
that all and only sentient beings possess morally-considerable inter-
ests.97 Those who accept sentientism should limit the scope of this 
argument against organism patents to the patenting of sentient ani-
mal life. Animals who feel pain and possess preferences are clearly 
not mere resources to which people may be naturally entitled.98 To 
conceptualize a sentient animal as a mere resource would be to con-
ceive of it as morally analogous to a utilitarian artifact. On this view, 
the moral issues involved when a neighbor pounds his pet dog with a 
hammer are the same as when he pounds his step ladder with a 
hammer. This is not a morally enlightened position. Thus, sentient 
animals-even when they are modified for human purposes-are not 
appropriately conceptualized as tools or instruments. If I am right 
that patenting an entity involves conceptualizing it as a mere resource 
or tool that lacks moral standing in its own right, then patenting 
sentient animals is clearly not appropriate. 
Although I subscribe to the biocentric ethic that all organisms are 
morally considerable, I do not accept biocentric egalitarianism.99 I 
allow that individual organisms have different degrees of moral sig-
nificance.loo Thus, in general, I find animal patents to be more trou-
bling than either plant or microbe patents. Still, I reject the idea that 
the moral problems with justifying organism patents become serious 
only when patenting our closest cousins, the sentient animals. In any 
case that the goods of viruses should count, even just a very small amount." See O'Neill, supra 
note 89, at 132. 
97 The most prominent defenders of this position are philosophers Peter Singer and Tom 
Regan. Both argue forcefully that all sentient beings-that is, beings who can feel pleasure and 
pain-are morally important in their own right. Singer also argues that only sentient beings are 
morally considerable. On this latter point, Regan's position is more ambiguous. The classic 
readings are PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (2d ed. 1990) and ToM REGAN, THE CASE 
FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983). While these philosophers' positions on the practical implications of 
sentientism are highly controversial, the idea that animals who can feel pleasure and pain count 
morally in their own right is not. There is considerable disagreement about whether and to what 
extent we should use sentient animals for food or medical research. But few argue that, for 
example, a dog's pain is not in itself a morally relevant consideration. For a development of this 
latter position, see generally WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR 
OPTIMAL POLLUTION 1-15 (1974), ch. 1. Baxter defends "anthropocentrism," the idea that all 
and only humans count morally in their own right. On such a view, animal pain has no direct 
moral relevance and only matters if it affects the interests of some human. 
98 Perhaps the best and most succinct statement of this argument is Tom Regan's article, The 
Case for Animal Rights, in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 13-26 (Peter Singer ed. 1985). 
99 Biocentric egalitarianism is the view that all living beings are equally morally important. 
For a powerful defense of this view, see TAYLOR, supra note 87, at 129-56. 
100 For the distinction between moral significance and moral considerability, see Goodpaster, 
supra note 87, at 311-12. 
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event, to move from microbe patents to animal patents in eight 
years101 without serious public debate about possible morally relevant 
differences is distressing and insensitive public policy.102 
2. Patenting Genes 
Genes are not living beings with goods of their own, and thus the 
above argument against patenting organisms-that patents inappro-
priately conceptualize organisms as mere resources-does not apply 
to gene patents. But other reasons suggests that patenting genes may 
also be inappropriate. Genetic material is the information structure 
underlying the three and a half billion year old story of the develop-
ment of life on this planet, including the emergence of the human life 
form.103 Proper appreciation of that story, and respect for the proc-
esses of evolution and speciation that drive life's development, count 
against gene patenting.104 
Naturally occuring genes are not human inventions or creations 
that people may rightfully own. Just as it is presumptuous to patent 
laws of nature, so too it is presumptuous to patent genes, which are 
equally fundamental to nature. Ideally, gene-types should be treated 
as a common heritage to be used by all beings who may benefit from 
them. As previously existing, nonexclusive objects that may be used 
beneficially by everyone at once, no one should possess the right to 
monopolize gene-types with patents or to "lock up" genes though any 
other property arrangements. 
101 The first microbe patent was issued in 1980 as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). See supra note 58 for a discussion of an anomalous 
earlier microbe patent. See also NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 51-53. Harvard 
University's oncomammal was the first animal patent and it was issued in 1988. ld. at 99. 
102 One of the arguments for patenting microbes that was used in the debate leading up to the 
Supreme Court's Chakrabarty decision was that allowing such patents would not result in 
patents on higher life forms. A judge claimed then that it was "far fetched" to think that 
patenting microbes would make patentable "all new, useful and nonobvious species of plants, 
animals, and insects created by man." See Bugos & Kevles, supra note 59, at 22. There has been 
some public debate on this issue: several bills dealing with animal patenting were introduced in 
Congress in 1987 and 1988. One that called for a moratorium on animal patents passed the 
Senate but was dropped in a House-Senate conference. For discussion, see KRIMSKY, supra 
note 15, at 51. 
103 See CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 516-18, for a discussion of the origin of genetic material 
and the antiquity of life. For a discussion of how life depends for its replication on transmission 
of genetic material, see CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 228--29. For a discussion of genetic material 
more generally, see CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at chs. 12-19. 
104 The idea that one might respect processes is foreign to traditional contractarian, Kantian, 
and utilitarian ethics. Even biocentrism-which only respects individual organisms-does not 
justify it. But respect for natural processes is an important theme in recent environmental 
philosophy. For arguments supporting the view that respect for natural processes is even more 
important than respect for living individuals, see generally ROLSTON, supra note 87, at 160-246. 
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The policy implications of accepting this view are significant. Ge-
netic material found on private land should not belong exclusively to 
landowners.l05 Landowners possess rights to use the genes for their 
own benefit, but landowners do not possess the right to exclude others 
from copying and using the genes. Accordingly, not only should 
biotechnology firms from the North be prohibited from patenting 
genes taken from the rural, poor, or indigenous peoples of the South,106 
but ideally-although not practically-these countries should also not 
restrict access to the genetic material found on their lands.l07 Addi-
tionally, not only should John Moore's doctors be prohibited from 
patenting the cell line produced from Moore's spleen,l08 but Moore-
and anyone else-should not prohibit others from accessing the valu-
able traits that his genes can provide. This assumes that noninvasive 
methods, such as taking a piece of hair, can be employed to obtain 
copies of genes.109 
105 In the United States, property rights in land do not give one identical property rights in 
the wildlife on that land. The geese that fly over the property or the deer that move through it 
cannot be disposed of as the owner sees fit: the state controls what happens to such wildlife. 
Hunting regulations are an example. Even plants that can not move off the land are under state 
control if they are members of an endangered species. I am suggesting that genes located in 
organisms on the land should also be held in public trust. For an argument that respect for 
endangered species limits property rights in land, see generally Holmes Rolston, Prope:rty 
Rights and Endangered Species, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 28:h'306 (1990). For a discussion of 
how property rights in land do not extend to the wildlife on the land, see Holmes Rolston III, 
Wildlife and Wildlands: A Christian Perspective, CHURCH & SOC'y, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 16-40 
(especially pp. 28-29). 
106 By "the South" I mean the nonindustrialized countries that are typically located in the 
Southern Hemisphere. By "the North" I mean the industrialized countries that are typically 
located in the Northern Hemisphere, such as the United States, Japan, and the nations of 
Europe. 
107 Given the present situation where biotechnology firms from the North patent genes taken 
from the South and then sell them back to those countries, it is appropriate for these countries 
to demand royalties for the genes found on their lands. Also, given that the genetically rich 
countries are often poor economically, distributive justice supports payments from the North 
for the genetic resources contained on the lands of the South. Many developing countries have 
opportunity costs associated with preserving biological diversity in their countries. Allowing 
them to charge royalties for the genes extracted from their lands would also provide compen-
sation for foregone opportunities. Furthermore, when the genes are extracted from plants 
cultivated by peoples in the South, then those who have cultivated the plants deserve some 
reward for their labor-as do those in biotechnology companies who turn the genes into useful 
products. For a discussion of these issues, see Hope Shand, Agbio and Third World Develop-
ment, BIOITECHNOLOGY, Mar. 1993, at S13, and see Hope Shand, There is a Conflict between 
Intellectual Prope:rty Rights and the Rights of Farmers in Developing Countries, 4 J. AGRIC. 
& ENVTL. ETHICS 131-42 (1991). 
108 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
109 The Human Genome Project intends to make copies of the genes of indigenous peoples 
from around the world. Ideally these peoples should freely allow the world to benefit from their 
genes. But biotechnology firms and the United States government are trying to patent and 
profit from these genes. "Currently, there are at least two patent applications, submitted by 
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3. Patenting Products of Nature 
One might expect that patenting naturally occurring entities would 
not be permitted. Patentable subject matter must be "novel" and 
there is a well established doctrine in patent law that "products of 
nature" are not patentable.no Moreover, to the extent that patent law 
relies on the natural entitlement to the fruits of labor rationale, pat-
ents should not be issued for discoveries, but only for inventions. "I 
discovered it and so this sort of thing is mine" is even a less plausible 
justification than is "I made it and so this sort of thing is mine." Thus, 
patenting naturally occuring genes or organisms that have been dis-
covered rather than invented would seem to be inappropriate. 
Patent law, however, allows patents for "whoever invents or dis-
covers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or compo-
sition of matter."lll Even the Constitution runs together the distinc-
tion between invention and discovery by giving Congress the power 
of "securing ... to inventors the exclusive right to their ... discover-
ies."112 The product of nature doctrine has been rendered vacuous by 
allowing that the isolation, purification, or alteration of an entity or 
substance from its natural state turns the entity or substance into 
something not "found in nature." Thus, genes are patentable when 
isolated from their "impure form," that is, fused with other DNA in 
an organism's cells. By placing foreign genes into organisms, these 
United States agencies, that are pending on portions of genomes of Third World peoples (Papua 
New Guinea and Solomon Island peoples, respectively)." See Philip L. Bereano, Sha'I'fULns and 
Patent Lawyers, 263 SCIENCE 1358 (1994). Will these peoples share in the profits made from 
their genes and will they be allowed free access to the beneficial uses of the genes extracted 
from their bodies? Given that these peoples are poor and are being driven to extinction by a 
world that is not much interested in what happens to them, indigenous peoples have every right 
to keep the resources nature has provided to them and use their genes as bargaining chips with 
the North. If the North is to play the property game with genes, then surely the South in its 
relationships with the North should also play this game. Given that people generally do not 
freely share their natural endowments with others-something, I am arguing they theoretically 
ought to do-it would be wrong to expect that indigenous, rural, or poor peoples do this. Thus, 
in the present context, indigenous peoples are perfectly justified in refusing to let others access 
their genes. For a discussion of this issue, see Rural Advancement Foundation International, 
The Patenting of HU'I'fULn Genetic Material, RAFI COMMUNIQUE (RAFI, Suite 504, 71 Bank 
St., Ottawa, Ontario KIP 5N2, Canada), Jan.-Feb. 1994. 
110 For a discussion, see Karl Bozicevic, Distinguishing 'Products of Nature' from Products 
Derived from Nature, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 415-26 (1987), and see Charles 
Berman & Nancy Lambrecht, Can You Patent a Product That Occurs Naturally? THE Los 
ANGELES DAILY J., Feb. 15, 1991, at 7. 
m 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added). 
112 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
1995] BIOTECH PATENTS 289 
organisms also become "substantially altered" and hence patentable 
"works of man."U3 
Although "bioengineering" is a difficult and, in some cases, creative 
labor, it does not produce creations or inventions. The isolation of a 
gene is not the same as the invention of a gene.U4 Placing a gene or 
several genes into an embryo and allowing the organism to develop 
and express the gene is an alteration, not a creation.115 Isolating a gene 
for straightness from one species of tree and placing the gene into 
another is more like transplanting a tree species to a new habitat than 
it is like creating or inventing a new tree. Furthermore, bioengineer-
ing only alters a tiny fraction of an organism's genome.U6 U ntH 
biotechnology advances well beyond its current state, the root idea of 
the Lockean labor argument for property-I created it and so it 
belongs to me-does not apply to the genes or organisms that biotech-
nicians manipulate.l17 
There is a substantial disanalogy between biopatents and the tra-
ditional subject matter of patents. Edison really did invent the light 
bulb. The Wright brothers did create a flying machine. But Harvard 
biotechnicians did not invent or create the oncomouse. Biotechnicians 
alter, modify, assist, or manipulate nature. Biotechnicians are not 
inventors of organisms or genes that could be appropriate objects for 
patents. 
113 For a discussion, see Barton, supra note 73, at 42-43. Barton there suggests that the Patent 
and Trademark Office is unlikely to issue "a patent for the use of a gene in a species in which it 
evolved naturally or in a species to which it can be transferred by normal breeding." [d. 
114 Nor is chemically synthesizing a gene that exists in a natural form to invent a new gene. 
True invention of a gene would involve creating a gene coding for a characteristic that no 
organism possesses. 
116 Concerning the insertion of a foreign gene into an animal, Mark Sagoff says, that "rather 
than invent a different animal, it leaves the original virtually unchanged." See Mark Sagoff, On 
Patenting Transgenic Animals 15 (1990) (unpublished manuscript, available from Sagoff at the 
University of Maryland's Center for Philosophy and Public Policy). 
116 Granted, small changes in genotype can produce large and dramatic changes in phenotype. 
For example, humans differ from chimpanzees genetically by less than 2%. But mammals 
typically have about one-hundred thousand genes. Manipulating twenty of these, the most that 
animal research is likely to involve for the foreseeable future, is a change in a mammal's genome 
of only 0.02%. The simple E. coli bacterium has about twenty-five hundred genes. Modifying 
twenty of its genes would be a change of 0.8%. See NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 14. 
117 Property rights in naturally occurring genes also may violate a Lockean restriction on 
property ownership. One of Locke's provisos on original acquisition of material from the common 
stock is that after the appropriation there must be "enough and as good left in common for 
others." See LOCKE, supra note 79, at ch. 5-' 27. A patent right to the use of a particular gene 
deprives all others of the use of that gene. Although there is other genetic material that could 
be appropriated and used, only the patent holder can now use that gene. Even those who 
discover the gene independently are prohibited from using it by patent law. For an attempt to 
respond to this type of objection, see Crespi, supra note 19, at 181. 
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C. The Desert Rationale 
According to the desert rationale for property rights, laborers, 
including biotechnicians, deserve to benefit from their labors, at least 
when their efforts aim to produce something socially useful.118 
Biotechnicians have put time, energy, and resources into their labor 
and so they deserve something in return for what they have done. 
Perhaps patents in genes and organisms may be justified as just 
deserts for biotechnicians' labor.119 
But patents are likely to give biotechnicians far more than they 
deserve. Consider a biotechnician who discovers that a combination 
of two bacterial genes inserted into legumes allows the legumes to 
grow with only twenty percent of the water previously needed. If 
what the biotechnician deserves is a reward proportional to the effort 
expended, a patent would give the biotechnician far too much of a 
reward, given the huge market value of these drought-resistant leg-
umes and the relatively modest effort involved in the discovery. Valu-
able biotechnologies can result from flashes of genius and years of 
diligent effort can prove fruitless. Thus, awarding patents in biotech-
nological innovations to those who produce them is likely to be a 
highly imprecise way of proportioning rewards to the effort biotech-
nicians expend. 
If what biotechnicians deserve is not rewards proportional to the 
efforts they expended, but rather the value their labor adds to the 
world, patents are still likely to give biotechnicians far more than they 
deserve. Consider once again the production of the genetically-altered 
legumes. Unless we accept the implausible view that human labor 
creates all value, we should acknowledge that much of the value of 
these drought-resistant legumes originated in the bacterial genes and 
the plants themselves. Genes and organisms are highly valuable natu-
ral givens. They constitute a "vast library of tried-and-true evolution-
ary inventions of the millions of species in natural ecosystems."l20 
When biotechnicians manipulate these entities and patent the results, 
the biotechnicians capture value far beyond what their innovative 
activity added to the world. A botanist objects to patent rights for 
plants on these grounds: 
118 For a philosophical analysis of what people deserve, see generally George Sher, DESERT 
(1987). 
119 For the arguments in this section applied to intellectual property in general, see Hettinger, 
supra note 77, at 40-43. 
120 Colwell, supra note 47, at 9. 
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Such legislation gives credence to breeders who can manipulate 
one or two genes of a traditional land race that evolved over 
thousands of years and then claim that something novel has been 
created .... Few of the edible, nutritional characteristics of the 
seed plants that now sustain us evolved for our benefit, under 
selective pressure from our forebears or through conscious breed-
ing by scientists. We are literally living off the fruits of other 
creatures' labors-those of the birds, bugs, and beasts that loosely 
coevolved with seed plants over the last hundred million years.121 
291 
Additionally, given the social character of innovation, much of the 
value brought into the world by these drought-resistant legumes is 
attributable to the intellectual predecessors of the biotechnicians, for 
example, Darwin and MendeU22 To claim that the biotechnician is 
responsible for the entire value of the modified organism or gene is 
like saying that the last person needed to lift a car should get full 
credit for lifting it. Undoubtedly biotechnicians sometimes add value 
to the world through their innovative activity, but such value is small 
when compared to the natural value of the materials that biotechni-
cians manipUlate and the social value contributed by others. In short, 
biopatents allow biotechnicians to capture value way beyond their 
contribution or their effort.123 
D. The Consequentialist-Incentive Rationale 
Although defenders of patents generally-and biopatents spe-
cifically-will often appeal to the laborer's entitlements and deserts, 
the arguments that have the most force in policy debates appeal to 
the beneficial consequences of patents. Defenders of biopatents are 
likely to argue that even if the above arguments are correct and that 
biopatents are disrespectful of life, misconstrue the nature of biotech-
nical innovation, and render inappropriate deserts for such innova-
tion, the tremendous social utility of biopatents outweighs these con-
siderations.l24 
121 GARY NABHAM, ENDURING SEEDS: NATIVE AMERICAN AGRICULTURE AND WILD PLANT 
CONSERVATION 6 (1989). 
122 Consider, as well, that a great deal of the biological research underlying private biopatents 
is publicly funded. 
123 The patent monopoly is limited to seventeen years. After this, anyone can freely appro-
priate the innovation. Perhaps this limitation is an acknowledgement that innovators are only 
partially responsible for the value of innovations. 
124 Although my arguments against biopatents have so far been nonconsequentialist in nature, 
I accept that these considerations could be overridden if biopatents provide sufficient social 
utility that is not achievable in less costly ways. 
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The argument, in its most prominent form, is that biopatents are 
necessary incentives for the production of socially optimal levels of 
biological innovation.l25 If we want new wonder drugs, oil-eating bac-
teria, and leaner, cheaper pigs, the best way to obtain them is to allow 
biotechnicians to patent these innovations and sell them in the mar-
ket. Without the patent incentive, such innovation would drastically 
slow. Competitors would let others innovate, copy the final product, 
and then undersell the innovator because competitors need not recoup 
the product's research and development costS.126 
Notice the paradoxical, self-undermining strategy of this approach. 
The approach involves trying to maximize social benefits from inno-
vation by putting constraints on society's ability to use and thus 
benefit from innovation. It grants monopolies that restrict the avail-
ability and use of innovations in order that there be new innovation 
and ultimately greater use and benefit from innovation.127 
Public funding as an alternative mechanism to induce innovation 
does not possess this drawback, because the results of publicly-funded 
innovation could be-and presumably should be-freely available to 
all. Public funding also gives society greater control over what form 
125 Related arguments include: (1) Patents prevent socially wasteful duplication of research 
efforts, because competitors will not waste time reinventing what another firm already has 
invented and patented, and thus patents increase the output of the resources put into techno-
logical innovation; (2) Private sector patents on government research results provide an induce-
ment to risk an attempt to commercialize a public-sector innovation; and (3) Patents induce 
further related innovation by providing incentives to invent around the patent. Much of what 
I say in the text also applies to these versions of the consequentialist argument for biopatents. 
126 A variant of this argument uses the nonconsequentialist language of preventing unfair 
competition. "There is considerable weight in the argument that the patent system provides 
the opportunity for individuals to transfer their discoveries to the market place without fear of 
unfair competition." See Patently Responsible, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 2, 1991, at 9. For example, 
if Monsanto Corporation were to copy Calgene Inc.'s Flavr Savr tomato instead of developing 
its own firm tomato, this would be cheating. But what counts as fair play in business is not 
independent of which rules lead to the most socially useful results. If maximum social utility 
would be achieved in a business climate where sharing ideas and appropriating other firms' 
designs were the norm, such behavior would not constitute unfair competition. Thus the debate 
over the consequences of a patenting regime underlies even the preventing-unfair-competition 
rationale for patents. 
127 Economist Joan Robinson puts the point this way: 
A patent is a device to prevent the diffusion of new methods before the original 
investor has recovered profit adequate to induce the requisite investment. The 
justification of the patent system is that by slowing down the diffusion of technical 
progress it ensures that there will be more progress to diffuse .... Since it is rooted 
in a contradiction, there can be no such thing as an ideally beneficial patent system, 
and it is bound to produce negative results in particular instances, impeding progress 
unnecessarily even if its general effect is favorable on balance. 
quoted in DOROTHY NELKIN, SCIENCE AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 15 (1984). 
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a technology takes. Public control is particularly important for tech-
nologies-such as biotechnology-that possess significant social and 
ethical dimensions. Although there exist significant possible draw-
backs to public funding,128 it is not obvious that public funding is an 
inferior way to provide for technological innovation. 
Consider the ways that biopatents may undermine rather than 
promote biotechnical innovation. Privatization of biological knowledge 
inhibits the scientific sharing of ideas and thus slows innovation. 
University-business joint ventures result in secrecy in university 
laboratories. One commentator notes a growing reluctance among 
researchers to freely exchange plasmids and cell lines.129 Further-
more, publication of scientific results is delayed until after the appli-
cation for and receipt of patents, a process that takes years to com-
plete.13o 
In response, defenders of biopatents will point out that if patents 
are unavailable, then people engaged in biological innovation will 
instead rely upon trade secrets. In terms of disclosure of knowledge 
underlying biotechnological innovation, trade secrets are far worse 
than patents. Patents require disclosure of the patented technology.131 
In contrast, trade secrecy protection requires nondisclosure. Thus, 
supporters of biopatents will argue that patents in biotechnological 
innovation encourages the release of biological information that would 
otherwise have been kept secret. This "exchange for secrecy"132 de-
fense of patents suggests that innovators be given a limited monopoly 
in their innovations in exchange for revealing the nature of the inven-
tion and thus allowing society to build upon this new knowledge. It is 
far from clear, however, whether the disclosure required with biopat-
ents gives society enough of a benefit to justify the costs of granting 
patent rights in return.133 
128 Drawbacks of public funding for innovation include a possible narrowing of the variety of 
technological approaches taken and the problem of generating revenue to pay for the innovative 
research. 
129 See A.J. Lemin, Patenting Microarganisms: Threats to Openness, in OWNING SCIENTIFIC 
AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, 193, 193-99 (Vivian Weil & John Snapper eds. 1989). 
130 See Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life, 28 Ju-
RIMETRICSJ. 399,422 n.l64 (1988). In 1989, it took an average offorty-two months for the Patent 
and Trademark Office to complete the examination process for a biotechnology patent applica-
tion. See NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 60. 
131 Patents require that what is patented be described in sufficient detail "to enable any person 
skilled in the art ... to make and use the same." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). 
132 See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, General Overview of the Intellectual Property System, in OWN-
ING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, 17, 19 (Vivian Weil & John Snapper eds. 1989). 
133 One patent attorney has argued that because a written description is often not sufficient 
for reproducing many biotechnology "inventions," recent court decisions failing to require 
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A recent editorial in a prominent economics magazine suggests that 
patents threaten to "crush" innovation.l34 For example, patents pro-
vide incentives for companies to take resources that they might oth-
erwise have spent on innovation and to put those resources into 
patent development and defense.135 Allowing patents in an industry 
may also suppress competition in that industry. Firms may buy up 
the patents of potential competitors in order to protect their current 
products.136 With the proliferation of patents, an industry becomes an 
increasingly difficult place to do business.137 The determination of 
what patents must be licensed and from whom consumes time and 
money. Fear of litigation shapes and hinders the innovative activity 
in such an industry.13s Thus, patents can act as barriers to entry into 
an industry, especially for small firms who cannot afford a staff of 
patent specialists.139 One commentator suggests that "playing with 
patents is like playing poker" and that "patent negotiation is brink-
manship."140 
deposits of biocultures "breaks the patent bargain" between the inventor and society to reveal 
the nature of the innovation. See Rudy Baum, Knotty Biotech Issues Receive Attention, CHEMI-
CAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Apr. 27, 1992, at 30, 31. Furthermore, United States patent law 
has no general research exemption allowing use of patented innovations for experimental 
purposes. See Barton, supra note 73, at 43. Thus deposits of patented organisms or genes would 
seem to do little to stimulate further innovation. 
134 The Harm of Patents, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 1992, at 17. 
135 See FRITZ MACHLUP, PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 169 (1962). Machlup writes: 
Id. 
In reply to the question whether patents are essential to the continuity of large 
expenditures for research and development, an officer of a large company stated that 
he might cut down these expenditures to perhaps one half of the amount spent at that 
time if patent protection were removed. It happened, however, that approximately one 
half of the R&D budget of that company was then devoted to the tasks of securing 
patents and enforcing the exclusive rights which they were supposed to confer. 
136 For one statement of this suggestion, see DAVID F. NOBLE, AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCI-
ENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM 85 (1977). 
137 See "Policing Thoughts," supra note 25, which points out that it is no defense against a 
patent infringement suit that one came up with the idea independently, without any knowledge 
of the patent-holder's innovation. Patents give the patent-holder exclusive rights of use even 
against independent inventors. Thus, before biotechnicians who come up with new biotech-
nological innovations can use them, they must do patent searches to make sure they are not 
infringing on others' patent rights. 
138 Business Week reported a fifty-two percent increase in patent litigation in the 1980s. See 
Michele Galen, et al. Legal Affairs, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 2, 1991, at 110, 110. 
139 Fritz Machlup suggests that sometimes "the patent position of the big firms makes it 
almost impossible for new firms to enter the industry; patent litigation carried on by big firms 
makes it difficult for small firms to defend their own patents successfully." See MACHLUP, supra 
note 135, at 170. 
140 Barry Fox, Patents in the Pending Tray, GUARDIAN, Feb. 9,1989, quoted in VAVER, supra 
note 95, at 25 n.54. 
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Are patents the best way to stimulate innovation? Do they work 
better than alternative mechanisms such as public funding? These are 
empirical questions with unknown answers.141 Thus, when considering 
how to insure an appropriate level of biotechnical innovation we must 
keep an open mind. We should not simply assume that an increased 
rate of protection will spur biotechnical innovation. Rather, as the 
above discussion suggests, increased patent protection may stifle 
biotechnical innovation and actually harm the biotechnology industry. 
IV. BIOTECHNOLOGY'S COSTS AND RISKS 
The argument that biopatents are the best way to stimulate bio-
logical innovation assumes that society will benefit from the profusion 
ofbiotechnical products. Even granting the significance of biotech no 1-
ogy's potential benefits, we must not assume that biotechnology is an 
unadulterated good. If biotechnology's critics are right about even 
some of their objections to biotechnology,142 it would be a mistake to 
stimulate this technology indiscriminately through offers of broad and 
lucrative utility patent grants. 
A. The Relevance of Biotechnology's Costs and Risks to Biopatents 
Defenders of biopatents point out that to allow patenting of a 
technology does not rule out regulatory control of that technology.143 
Thus they suggest that the costs and risks of biotechnology, although 
relevant to issues concerning the regulation of biotechnology, are not 
relevant to the patenting question. A patent is not a right to use a 
141 This is a frequently made point. For example, according to Rebecca Dresser, "there is a 
lack of empirical data to establish definitively that patenting does stimulate innovation." See 
Dresser, supra note 130, at 404 n.26. For arguments that the patent system "does not play 
anything like a dominant role among the various mechanism by which returns from innovation 
are captured" and that it "functions differently in different manufacturing industries," see 
Sidney G. Winter, Patents in Complex Contexts: Incentives and Effectiveness, in OWNING 
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, 41, 41-60 (Vivian Wei! & John Snapper eds. 1989). 
One study commissioned by Congress in the 1950s-the Melman study--concluded that the 
patent system was "a restraint rather than an impetus" to research. For a discussion, see 
Charles Weiner, Patenting and Academic Research: Historical Case Studies, in OWNING 
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, 87, 99-103 (Vivian Wei! & John Snapper eds. 1989). 
Even a strong defender of biotechnology patents admits that "[a]lthough a hope of slowing 
biotechnology research is advanced by most of the opponents to the patenting of living organ-
isms, the extent to which a moratorium on patenting might affect the rate of technological 
development or minimize perceived risks is entirely speculative." See Adler, supra note 41, at 
2 n.6. 
142 See infra notes 150-71 and accompanying text. 
143 See Raines, supra note 28, at 66-67. 
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particular technology, but a right to exclude others from using the 
technology. Thus, patenting and regulatory control of biotechnology 
may exist simultaneously and harmoniously.144 
Although theoretically sound, this point is practically suspect. If 
patents really are the powerful incentive their proponents claim them 
to be, then biopatents are likely to contribute to biotechnologies being 
introduced and exploited before their negative impacts can be prop-
erly assessed. This in turn will make it more difficult for society to 
steer biotechnology in a sustainable and morally appropriate direc-
tion. Biopatents foster sentiments against the regulation of biotech-
nology. Commercial interests that have heavily invested in developing 
and patenting biotechnologies will exert considerable pressure on 
government not to regulate these patented biotechnologies.145 This 
pressure will be considerable, because once biopatents are issued, 
government regulation of that biotechnology becomes government 
restriction of private property rights.146 
Here we may learn from the European practice of settling certain 
moral questions before issuing patents. The European Patent Con-
vention prohibits patents for inventions that are "contrary to public 
order or morality."147 When determining whether to issue animal pat-
ents, for example, the European Patent Office conducts a cost-benefit 
analysis that weighs the costs in animal suffering and risks to the 
environment against the expected benefits to humans and other ani-
mals.148 Ethical and environmental scrutiny of biotechnical innova-
tions should be part of patenting decisions in this country as well.149 
144 Paul Thompson makes the point that if we think certain biotechnologies are inappropriate, 
then we should prohibit such technologies outright rather than simply prohibiting patenting 
these technologies. See Paul Thompson, Designing Animals: Ethical Issues for Genetic Engi-
neers 8 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, available from Thompson at The Center for Biotech-
nology Policy and Ethics, Texas A&M University). 
145 Consider, for example, the industry'S apparently successful campaign against mandatory 
labelling of biotechnological food products, and its victory with the Food and Drug Administra-
tion policy that gene-altered foods will not be required to undergo a special review process. See 
Philip J. Hilts, U.S. to Speed Gene-Product Approvals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1992, at D9. 
146 The recent backlash against environmental regulations because they allegedly constitute 
"takings" of private property without just compensation illustrates the special difficulties in 
regulating uses of private property. 
147 The Convention on the Grant of European Patents was signed in October 1973 and came 
into force in 1977. The quoted provision comes from Article 53(a). For a discussion of the 
convention, see NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 158. For a discussion of the provision, 
see Susan Mayer & Daniel Alexander, Mice, Morals and the Environment, NEW SCIENTIST, 
Nov. 23, 1991, at 12. 
148 ld. 
149 For a helpful discussion about whether the Patent Office should morally evaluate an 
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B. Costs 
One might think that biotechnology, like other technologies, is in-
trinsically neutral and that only the consequences of biotechnology's 
uses could have positive or negative value. But there exist reasons 
for disapproving of biotechnology apart from any unfortunate results 
biotechnologies may produce. Modern biotechnology is a significant 
change in, as well as enhancement of, humankind's ability to manipu-
late and control nature. It allows us to manipulate nature "from the 
inside out."150 In many people's eyes, too much of the world is already 
domesticated and manipulated by humans.151 A significant loss of 
value occurs when, instead of encountering other natures, we find 
human nature, purpose, and design wherever we turn. Thus, although 
specific uses of biotechnology will be of positive value on balance, 
these benefits will come at the cost of further human manipulation of 
the planet. 
Another cost of biotechnology is the potential for greater suffering 
of nonhuman animals. For example, a major use of animal biotechnol-
ogy involves the deliberate production of diseased animals.l52 What is 
the quality of life of an oncomouse, genetically altered to develop 
breast cancer? A Food and Drug Administration official approvingly 
speaks of "a veritable L.L. Bean catalogue of transgenic mice ... for 
the study of genetic diseases, developmental abnormalities, and onco-
genesis," and of "animals tailored to be hypersensitive to a variety of 
carcinogens, mutagens, teratogens, or other poisons."l53 Another ma-
jor use of animal biotechnologies involves altering animals that hu-
mans use for food to make them larger or more productive.l54 Consider 
the "Beltsville pigs" into whom the United States Department of 
Agriculture placed a human growth hormone gene: "[t]he pigs were 
bowlegged, cross-eyed, arthritic, and had dysfunctional immune sys-
tems that made them susceptible to pneumonia."l55 There is also con-
cern about the welfare of dairy cows who have been injected with 
innovation when determining if the innovation satisfies the patent criterion of utility, see RAss, 
supra note 94, at 140-43. 
150 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
151 See Ned Hettinger & Bill Throop, Can Ecocentric Ethics Withstand Chaos in Ecology 
(1994) (unpublished manuscript, available from the author). 
152 Three of the first four animal patents are for animals altered to be disease prone and 
intended to be used as research specimens. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
153 Miller, supra note 31, at 24. 
154 NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 98. 
155 For a careful description of these pigs, see Gary Comstock, Should We Genetically Engi-
neer Hogs, 8 BETWEEN THE SPECIES 196 (1992). 
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genetically engineered bovine growth hormone to increase an already 
extraordinary rate of milk production.l56 
Biotechnology could be used, however, to lessen the suffering of 
nonhuman animals and to decrease human reliance on other animals. 
Bacteria genetically altered to make a substitute for rennet from 
calves' stomachs are currently used to age and coagulate up to thirty-
five percent of the nation's cheese.157 Mice altered to contain part of 
the H.LV. virus can be used to substitute for chimpanzees in certain 
kinds of A.LD.S research.158 It remains to be seen, however, whether 
biotechnical innovation will shift the burden of our use of other life 
forms toward less sophisticated organisms or increase our depend-
ence on sentient life. Biopatents are certainly not a mechanism for 
insuring that biotechnology leads to overall decrease in suffering. 
Concerns exist about the kinds of organisms produced that tran-
scend the issue of suffering. Even if no suffering is involved, there 
exists a presumption against producing creatures such as "geeps," 
chimeras with heads of goats and bodies of sheep.159 A future where 
descendants of chickens are wired to the floor, connected to input and 
output tubes, and do not mind because their sentience has been 
biotechnologically removed is not a pleasing picture of what biotech-
nology may bring.loo There exists a significant burden of justification 
against the production of such monstrous transformations of living 
beings into mechanical, artifactual modes of existence.161 Prima facie, 
156 For a discussion, see Michael Fox, SUPERPIGS AND WONDERCORN 123--24 (1992). 
157 See Rebecca Goldburg & Douglas Hopkins, Why the U.S. Should Regulate Gene-Altered 
Foods, ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND LETTER, Nov. 1991, at 7. 
158 Raines, supra note 28, at 68. Raines thinks it "most promising" that we might produce 
cattle who are resistant to shipping fever, thus reducing the suffering they undergo while being 
transported to feedlots. Id. So, instead of changing our transportation practice of crowding 
cattle together, we change the cattle so that they do not acquire disease as a result. This 
exemplifies a worrisome pattern in our genetic alteration of animals: instead of revising our 
questionable practices with animals, we genetically edit out their "troublesome" traits. 
169 See supra note 45. 
160 For a powerful development of this example, see Gary Comstock, What Obligations Have 
Scientists to Transgenic Animals? ETHICS AND PATENTING OF TRANSGENIC ORGANISMS (Na-
tional Agricultural Biotechnology Council Occasional Papers #1), Sept. 1992, at 71. See also B. 
E. Rollin, The 'Frankenstein Thing': The Moral Impact of Genetic Engineering of Agricultural 
Animals on Society and Future Science, in AGRICULTURAL BIOETHICS: IMPLICATIONS OF 
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 306-07 (Steven Gendel et al. eds. 1990). Rollin argues that 
since intensification in animal agriculture will continue, the goal of engineering insentient 
agricultural animals is not morally problematic. Forced to choose between a world with insen-
tient agricultural animals and one with sentient agricultural animals who greatly suffer, I too 
would choose the former. Perhaps this is Rollin's point. But this is compatible with judging the 
production of such animals as morally obnoxious. Rollin thinks the only possible objections to 
this scenario are aesthetic. 
161 For similar suggestions, see generally J. Baird Callicott, Animal Liberation: A Triangular 
Affair, 2 ENVTL. ETHICS 311 (1980). 
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biotechnology should not be used to impoverish creatures, to strip 
away their capacities, or to diminish the richness of their lives.162 This 
objection is not limited to sentient life. Consider a genetically-engi-
neered "apple tree" that possesses one giant apple that rests on the 
ground. Devoid of a trunk or branches, the organism possesses one 
large leaf for photosynthesis and a thick tap root for minerals and 
water. This also is not a desirable addition to the planet. 
C. Risks 
Claims by both advocates and critics concerning the environmental 
risks of biotechnology seem exaggerated. One advocate suggests that 
genetic engineering is safer than traditional crossbreeding because 
genetic engineering alters many fewer genes.163 Some critics think 
that any use of genetically-altered organisms in open environments 
courts ecological disaster.164 The safety of this technology is unclear. 
As one commentator has concluded: 
Biologists continue to disagree about the possible hazards of test-
ing and using genetically engineered microorganisms, plants, and 
animals in the open environment. Although no one contests the 
fact that the risks are highly case specific and that different kinds 
of organisms require different levels of oversight, overall assess-
ments still range from confident reassurance to serious concern.165 
Although biotechnology has maintained a good safety record so 
far,166 this should not lead us to conclude that there exist no significant 
162 I say prima facie, because this obligation is not absolute. Sufficiently important benefits 
achievable in no other way could make such a use of biotechnology permissible. 
163 See Brill, supra note 46, at 46-47. This argument ignores the potential for risk resulting 
from combining genes from vastly different sources. That crossing closely related species has 
proven to be safe is not evidence that crossing genes from totally unrelated species will be safe. 
Brill raises numerous other arguments for the inherent and generic safety of genetically-altered 
organisms, many of which are persuasively rebutted in Leslie Roberts' Ecologists Wary About 
Environmental Releases, 243 SCIENCE 1141, 1141 (1989). 
164 Jeremy Rifkin thinks that each introduction of a genetically-altered organism into the 
environment is "tantamount to playing ecological roulette," because "like exotic organisms, it is 
not a naturally occuring life form. It has been artificially introduced into a complex environment 
that has developed a web of highly synchronized relationships over millions of years." See Rifkin, 
supra note 51, at 224. This argument is so general that it also applies to traditional selectively 
bred plants and animals. Although there have been cases of extremely detrimental conse-
quences resulting from introducing these species into the natural environment-such as the 
effects of cattle on the western range-it is implausible to think that, for example, releasing a 
new breed of horse into a pasture is to risk ecological disaster. 
166 Colwell, supra note 47, at 25. 
166 As of 1991, there had been several hundred small-scale field tests of genetically engineered 
organisms, none of which had led to known adverse consequences. See Richard Hindmarsh, The 
Flawed "Sustainable" Promise of Genetic Engineering, 21 ECOLOGIST 196, 202 (1991). In 
August 1994, the Union of Concerned Scientists reported that there had been several thousand 
300 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:267 
risks associated with biotechnology.167 The risks concern the potential 
effects of altered organisms on other organisms and on the structures 
of ecosystems. One problem is the difficulty of keeping introduced 
genes from migrating outside of genetically-altered organisms. For 
example, genes for disease or herbicide resistance could migrate from 
genetically-altered crops into their weedy relatives, resulting in vig-
orous and difficult to control pests. Research has shown that "crops 
can readily mate with related weeds over a thousand yards away" and 
that recalling such genes "may be close to impossible."168 
Another problem is the potential damage to ecosystems of geneti-
cally-altered organisms. Biotechnicians can genetically alter fish to 
grow forty percent larger.169 How would such fish affect the tropic 
relationships in their ecosystems should they escape or be released? 
Problems caused by the intentional and unintentional introduction of 
exotics should humble us about our ability to predict and control the 
effects of our actions on ecosystems.170 Even in cases where no ad-
verse impacts on the ecological functioning of natural ecosystems 
occur, the mere presence of introduced genes and genetically-altered 
organisms degrades these ecosystems by diminishing the naturalness 
or wildness of these ecosystems.l71 
experimental releases of genetically-altered organisms in the United States alone. See Union of 
Concerned Scientists, Experimental Release of Genetically Engineered Organisms, THE GENE 
EXCHANGE, Aug. 1994, at 12. To my knowledge, none of these has resulted in harmful environ-
mental consequences. 
167 For another discussion of the ongoing controversy over the safety of releasing genetically-
altered organisms into the environment, see Keith Schneider, Study Finds Risk to Environment 
in Making Plants Genetically Resistant to Viruses, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 11, 1994, at A16. 
168 Norman Ellstrand, How Ya Gonna Keep Transgenes Down on the Farm?, THE AMICUS J., 
Spring 1993, at 31. 
169 See New Prospects for Gene-Altered Fish Raise Hope and Alarm, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 27, 
1990, at C4. 
170 For example, Japanese kudzu vine which can grow two meters a week is considered a real 
problem across some parts of North America where it often overgrows native forests. See 
ROGER J. LEDERER, ECOLOGY AND FIELD BIOLOGY 142 (1984). Another example is the intro-
duction of the Nile perch into East Africa's Lake Victoria. One wildlife ecologist suggests that 
this introduction may "result in as many extinctions as all the introductions of domestic cats 
onto the oceanic islands of the world." See Stanley A. Temple, The Nasty Necessity: Eradicating 
Exotics, 4 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 114 (1990). The introduction of cats onto islands has a track 
record of producing highly detrimental effects. See GARY K. MEFFE & C. RONALD CARROLL, 
PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 224 (1994). Robert Colwell summarizes this concern 
when he says that "Ecologists have insisted that there are lessons to be learned from the record 
of long-term environmental effects of nonnative organisms introduced by humans on every 
continent and island." See Colwell, supra note 47, at 25. 
171 For example, Robert Colwell argues that, at least for nondomesticated species living in 
reasonably natural ecosystems, "the intrinsic value of a species is diminished by its genetic 
alteration though human intervention." Id. at 29. Despite his cutting criticism of Jeremy Rifkin's 
attack on biotechnology, Stephen Jay Gould also argues for "respecting the integrity of evolu-
tionary lineages." See Gould, supra note 46, at 34. For a philosopher arguing that significant 
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V. DIRECT COSTS OF BIOPATENTS 
To determine if patent incentives are desirable, we must not only 
weigh the possible negative consequences of biotechnology against its 
much discussed benefits, but also consider the unfortunate conse-
quences of biopatents themselves. Biopatents will further squeeze 
small farmers and increase the power and wealth of giant agribusi-
nesses who are likely to own the new biopatents. With animal patents, 
farmers and ranchers must pay royalties on offspring of animals that 
they own and breed. This has led one Congressman to suggest that 
"major chemical, biotechnological, and pharmaceutical companies [will 
be] in the position to virtually take over animal husbandry in Amer-
ica."172 That biopatents prevent farmers from saving and using seeds 
from patented crops173 suggests that the farmer "is on his way to 
becoming a 'tender' of genes owned by someone else."174 
The ability to patent genetic material also fuels "genetic prospect-
ing" of the South by the North. Biotechnology companies freely col-
lect genetic material from organisms in the South, isolate useful 
genes, patent the genes, and then sell the products based on these 
genes back to the countries from which the genes were extracted.175 
This practice is an embodiment of the mistaken view that only human 
labor creates value. On this view, before labor is added, genetic ma-
terial is worthless and hence free for the taking.176 The John Moore 
case discussed earlier is based on the same faulty thinking: Because 
human interference in wild ecosystems diminishes their value, see Robert Elliot, Faking Na-
ture,25 INQUIRY 81-93 (1982). 
172 Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, House Committee on the Judiciary, 
l00th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1988) (statement of Representative Charles Rose). The bracketed 
material is my addition. 
173 This is a significant restriction given that almost half of wheat and soybeans crops are 
grown from farmer saved seeds. See NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 11, at 79. Prohibiting 
farmers from using seeds from the crops they grow is incredibly wasteful and is analogous to 
computer companies insisting that the software they sell only be used once. One commentator 
claims that it is "unimaginable" that sellers of patented seeds will prohibit this use. Barton, 
supra note 73, at 43. But the owner of the first patented animal is requesting a license fee from 
those who buy and then breed its patented mouse. Prohibiting farmers from going into business 
selling the offspring of patented organisms is perhaps justifiable. But preventing farmers from 
themselves using offspring of patented organisms gives the producer undue control over the 
product after it has been sold. 
174 Quote attributed to Jack Doyle. See Sinclair, supra note 53, at A9. 
175 The Monsanto Magazine recently encouraged Monsanto Corporation employees who were 
traveling in exotic places to collect plant and soil samples. See Jonathan King, Breeding Uni-
formity, 15 AMICUS J., Spring 1993, at 25. 
176 The United States refused to sign the biodiversity treaty at the June 1992 Earth Summit 
because the treaty encouraged the South to preserve its genetic diversity by giving it rights to 
profit from uses that might be found for the genetic materials extracted from its lands. This 
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his doctors, not Moore, labored to turn his diseased spleen into some-
thing useful, they enjoy the entire commercial value of the resulting 
cell line and Moore receives none of this value.177 
Consider further the kind of incentives patents provide. Perhaps 
half of agribusiness research into biotechnology aims at the produc-
tion of herbicide-tolerant crops.178 The vertically-integrated agribusi-
ness industry dominated by petroleum, chemical, and pharmaceutical 
conglomerates puts its energy into genetically altering crops to with-
stand the chemicals sold by the industry. Herbicide-tolerant crops 
undermine a recent laudable trend toward organic farming and fur-
ther entrench the chemical approach to agriculture.179 
More ecologically sound and just biotechnologies-such as develop-
ing nitrogen fixing plants that reduce the need for fertilizers or stress 
resistant rice that is important for the poor peoples of the South-are 
left to the public sector to develop. But even the public sector's 
incentives are distorted by patents and the increased reliance on 
industry funds.180 According to one analyst, major public universities 
are not pursuing biotechnology safety research or research aimed at 
benefiting the peasants of the South. Rather, public universities are 
turning to "market relevant" -that is, patentable and profitable-
biotechnology research.181 
would lessen the value of patent rights for the researchers from the North most likely to find 
those uses. See Policing Thoughts, supra note 25, at 55. Unless one assumes that this genetic 
material has no value and only acquires value as a result of researchers discovering its uses, a 
sharing of the profit this material provides between the countries of origin and the laborers who 
add value seems appropriate. For discussion, see supra notes 25, 105-09 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
178 See Hindmarsh, supra note 166, at 197. The Union of Concerned Scientists reports that 
forty-seven percent of field tested transgenic crops between 1987 and 1994 where herbicide 
tolerant crops. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Traits Most Commonly Tested in Transgenic 
Crop Field Trials, THE GENE EXCHANGE, June 1994, at 7. 
179 According to Hindmarsh: 
Worldwide, more than 79 corporate/state research programs are developing over 23 
herbicide-tolerant crop lines .... These will further entrench the chemical approach 
to agriculture, which in turn will further increase soil and water pollution, pest resis-
tance and chemical residues in food. In the process, natural ecological process will be 
further distorted and the erosion of biodiversity accelerated. 
See Hindmarsh, supra note 166, at 198. 
180 See A. David Kline, Bioethics-Impact of Proprietary Rights on Public Research Goals, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH PLANTS, (American Society of Agron-
omy Special Publication no. 52), 1989, at 25--34. 
181 Id. For the last three years, the United States Department of Agriculture has been 
awarding grants to university scientists to evaluate the risks associated with agricultural 
biotechnology products. See Union of Concerned Scientists, USDA Risk Assessment Grants 
Awarded, THE GENE EXCHANGE, Aug. 1994, at 4. 
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Once patents are the means by which we stimulate biotechnology 
research and innovation, this research and innovation will serve the 
purposes of private gain, whether or not this coincides with the public 
interest. Given both the significant possible benefits and drawbacks 
of the new biotechnologies, do we really want to let the profit motive 
lead us into the future that biotechnology will create?l82 Considering 
where the profit motive has led us in the past with environmental 
protection and respect for nonhuman nature, I think the answer is 
"No."l83 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There exist serious difficulties with justifying intellectual property 
in general and biopatents in particular. The rationales in favor of 
biopatents, although not totally without merit, have significant weak-
nesses. Biopatents cannot be justified as natural entitlements to the 
fruits of labor. That biotechnicians are naturally entitled to the fruits 
of their labor does not justify biopatents, because patents are social 
products not created by the laborer. Biotechnicians are not even 
naturally entitled to the individual organisms they manipulate, be-
cause genetically-altered organisms have morally-considerable wel-
fare-interests and are not mere instruments for human benefit. 
Whether altered or isolated, neither organisms nor naturally occur-
ring genes are humanly-created tools appropriately viewed as patent-
able inventions. Attempts to justify biopatents as deserved rewards 
for labor ignore the natural and social origin of most of the value of 
patented organisms and genes. Finally, the argument that biopatents 
are the best way to stimulate a socially optimal level of biotechnical 
innovation is not only empirically unproven but also fails to take 
seriously the ways biopatents stifle innovation, the costs and risks of 
biotechnology, and the antisocial nature of the incentives provided. 
The burden of justification on those who favor monopoly rights for 
nonexclusive objects has not been met by the arguments in favor of 
biopatents. 
The attempt to assimilate these results of biotechnology to tradi-
tional inventions by including them under the utility patent system is 
a mistake. Such assimilation encourages us to think of living organ-
isms and the essential instructions of living organisms as human 
182 For a powerful statement of this point, see Annas, supra note 18, at 20--22. 
183 For support of the idea that an economic approach to environmental protection is inade-
quate and has failed miserably, see generally Mark Sagoff, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: 
PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988). 
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inventions and tools. We socially organize ourselves with respect to 
these altered forms of life as we do with any other new gadget: we 
issue a patent. This institutionalizes disrespect for life. 
Treating genetically-altered organisms and genes as patentable in-
ventions manifests the same vices that brought us to the degraded 
and impoverished condition of the natural world that exists today. Our 
selfish anthropocentrism is on display when patenting microbes, 
plants, and animals is thought to raise no moral issues, while the 
patenting of types of humans-including human-animal hybrids-is 
considered unthinkable. This social policy carries on the tradition of 
human possession, mastery, manipulation, and domination of nature. 
It perpetuates our conception of ourselves as conquerors of the land 
community, instead of helping us become plain members and citizens 
of that community. If we want to change how we think about other 
living beings and to heal our relationship with the earth, these biopat-
ents will get in the way. 
Technology is a lens through which we see the world. Biotechnol-
ogy-both old and new-can and has changed our understanding of 
ourselves, nature, and our place in nature. Biotechnology is not simply 
another mechanical or chemical procedure aimed at making the world 
better for us. With biotechnology, we are not reshaping matter, but 
harnessing life. We take a 3,500 million year old process that shaped 
our existence and the existence of every other organism on the planet 
and restructure it for our benefit. We need a more thoughtful concep-
tualization of this technology and more careful control over its devel-
opment and use than is allowed by gung ho biopatent policies. 
Biotechnology does offer promise and hope for bettering human life 
and perhaps other life as well. Opposing biopatents does not entail 
opposing biotechnology. Organism and gene patents should be re-
sisted not because biotechnology should be resisted, but rather be-
cause these biopatents are a morally dangerous and inappropriate 
way of thinking about and encouraging biotechnology. 
Organism and gene patents have been the focus of my critical 
assessment. Without these two types of patents, biotechnical innova-
tion would probably proceed substantially unhindered. Not only is the 
incentive effect of these patents unknown, but other types of biotech-
nology patents could continue to exist, including process patents, 
specific use patents, and organism-mixture patents. In addition, other 
forms of property protection-such as licensing agreements-could 
also continue to exist. Although these remaining patents suffer the 
defects that I have identified with patents in general, they are not so 
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clearly disrespectful of life or dis analogous with traditional inventions 
as are organism and gene patents. 
Let us begin to reform our biotechnology incentive system by abol-
ishing organism and gene patents. In addition, let us explore new 
mechanisms for stimulating the development of appropriate biotech-
nologies. Increased public funding for biotechnical research should be 
used to offset unwanted decreases in incentives to innovate, should 
they result. If public funding is undesirable or infeasible for important 
kinds of biological innovation, and if we truly need additional private 
incentives, then let us think creatively and develop new and appro-
priate incentives.l84 Let us rethink and rework our mechanisms for 
stimulating and directing biotechnology into more respectful and sen-
sible institutions. 
184 For example, we could use some provisions of the Copyright Statutes or adapt features 
from the Plant Variety Protection Act. For discussion of using copyright law to protect biotech-
nology, see Donna Smith, Copyright Protection for the Intellectual Property Rights to Recom-
binant Deoxyribonucleic Acid: A Proposal, 19 ST. MARY'S L. J. 1083-113 (1988). See also Irving 
Kay ton, Copyright in Living Genetically Engineered Works, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191-218 
(1982). For discussion of the Plant Variety Protection Act, see supra note 60 and accompanying 
text. 
